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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

In the :!\fatter of the Estate
of
ALBERT J. DUQUESNE, also
known as A. J. DUQUESNE,

Case No.
12908

Deceased.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Statement of the Case
This is an appeal from a summary judgment determining that Hespondent is an heir at law of the decedent and from denial of the Appellants' Motion for
a Summary Judgment determining that Appellants
are the heirs at law of the decedent.

Disposition in Lower Court
Counsel for Appellants and Respondents upon
stipulated facts filed l\Iotions for Summary Judgment
determining heirship, supported by memoranda of law.
After oral argument, Respondent's Motion was granted and Appellants' .Motion was denied.
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Relief Sought on Appeal
Appellants, l\Iarguerite Hornberg and Jeannette
Hadke, seek reversal of both the summary judgment
determining Respondent to be the decedent's heir at
law, and of the order denying Appellants' l\Iotion for
a Summary Judgment determining that they are decedent's heirs at law.

Statc111c11t of Facts
This controversy came before the District Court
on a Petition for Determination of Heirship filed by
the Appellants, Jeannette Radke and Marguerite
Horberg [lleconl at 22-27], supported by a l\Iemo·
randum [llecord at 28-2g] which incorporated by ref·
erence documentary evidence as Exhibits "A" through
"O" which were attached thereto [llecord at 30-118].
The Petihmers are nieces of the decedent, that is, they
are children of his half-sister Eugenia. But for the al·
legations of Respondent, that the mother of Appellants
was born illegitimate in Illinois, there woulcl be no ques·
tion that Appellants would he the heirs at law of the
dcceclc11t. In response to Appellants Petition, TracyCollins Bank & Trust Company, the .Administrator of
the Estate, filed a Petition for Determination of Heir·
ship [llecord at 128- l:l2]. The Court ordered the mat·
ter to be set on the trial calendar and fixed December
G, rn71 as the final date on which interested parties
could appear in opposition to Appellants' Petition
[Record at 13"1<]. Respondent, Andrew J. Scherer, en·

a
tered an appearance, answering the Petition of Radke
and Hornberg for determination of Heirship, and alleging that he is a cousin-german of the decedent, as an
issue of the brother of decedent's deceased mother, and
that the class of cousins-german of the decedent given
notice by the Adm;nistrator of the probate proceeding
as the next of kin are the decedent's heirs at law [Recon1 at 165-07].
Respondent, Andrew J. Scherer, and Appellants,
Radke and Hornberg, the only real parties in interest
who filed appearances, mutually desiring that heirship
he determined at the earliest possible time, entered into
aml filed a Stipulation of Facts [Record at 172-174].
It was stipulated that Exhibit "A" attached to Appellants' Memorandum in Support of Petition for Determination of Heirship, accurately shows the relationship of Radke and Hornberg to the decedent, i.e. nieces
of the half-blood, who are daughters of decedent's halfsister, Eugenia. For the convenience of the Court, Exhibit "A" is reproduced in Appendix "A" to this brief.
Although Respondent claims that the father of the decedent was never married to the barandmother of Radke
and Hornberg, it is admitted that he duly acknowledged
their mother as his daughter. The Stipulation further
provided, that Exhibits "A" through "O" attached to
Appellants' Petition be admitted into evidence and that,
in the event the Court should determine that Radke and
Hornberg do not succeed to the Estate of the decedent
as children of the decedent's sister pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated, section 7 4-4-5 ( 4) , 1953, the class of
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cousms-german of the dececlent to which Respondenl
belongs succee<ls to the Estate per capita as next of'kin
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, section 74-4-5(6),
1!);):3, being relate<l to the deceased in the same fourt\ 1
degree of collateral consanguinity and claiming throug\1
the same ancestor pursuant to Utah Code Annotated.
section 7 4-4-16, l\);33. Although the relevancy of the
Illinois law of legitimation is contested as a matter of
law, the mother of appellauts having been born and rear·
ed in Illinois, it was stipulated that, under Illinois law
then in force, an illegitimate child was not an heir of
its father unless its parents inter-married and the ille·
gilimate child was acknowledged by the father as his
child.
Appellants and Hespondent each filed l\Iotions
for Summary .Judgment based on the Stipulation
[Hecord at 172-74]. After oral argument, Judge
Gordon H. Hall granted llespondent's l\Iotion for
Summary Judgment and denied Appellants' Motion
for Sununarv Ju<lo·ment on the grounds that section
·'
b
'
7-t-4-10 of Utah Code . Annotated, 1953, is a legitima·
tion statute rather than a succession statute only, that
the law of status in force at the situs of the birth of
Appellants' mother, therefore, governs Appellants' ca·
pacity to inhuit through their mother, and that the
cases of In re Forncy's Estate, 43 Nev. 227, 184 P. 206
3
(191!)) and Popp v. Roth, 9 Utah 2d 96, 338 P.2dl2
(1959) govern this case [Record at 240].
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POINT I.
THE 'J'HIAL COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE FIRST SENTENCE OF SECTION 74-4-10, UTAH
CODE .ANNOTATED, 1953, IS ALEGITUIATION STATUTE.
The first sentence of Utah Code Annotated, section 74-4-10 ( 1953) governs the capacity of an illegitimate to inherit the estate of a Utah intestate, but does
not purport to affect his or her status as an illegitimate. Neither does this provision by its terms require
legitimation as a precondition to inheritance as do the
statutes of many other states, including Illinois.
In addition to the obvious internal arguments, that
the first sentence of the section appears in the Utah
Probate Code, and that it is specifically directed solely
to the heirship of illegitimates, there is Utah case law
directly on point holding that it does not affect the
status of an illegitimate, hut affects only his capacity
to inherit.

The Utah Supreme Court examined this provision
(formerly section 2833 of Revised Statutes of Utah,
1898) along with the legitimation statute which is now
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, section 78-30-12 (formerly section 10 of Revised Statutes of Utah, 1898) in
In re Garr's Estate, 31 Utah 57, 86 P. 757 (1906). Although the Court found that there was sufficient evidence of adoption by acknowledgment to satisfy the

'1
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legitimation statute, it held that legitimation was no!
necessary for inheritance under what is now section
74-4-10. The Court reviewed the statutory history of the
provisions, <leciding that:
"[t]o discover the true object of this particular enactment and the general policy of the
state it becomes important to examine and
consider other statutes made previously upon
this subject. For such purpose all such legislation shoulcl Le examined and construed together. The general doctrine and policy of the
statute, expressed in anterior legislation, may
constitute potent factors in determining the
intent of the last expression of legislative
will." Id. at 761.
Accordingly the Court re,·iewed the identical pre·
<lecessor statute repealed by section 1 l of the :Edmunds·
Tucker Act which expressly declared the issue of plural
marriages illegitimate and reniked the right of i11egiti·
mates to inherit in Utah. Act of l\Iarch 3, 1887, Ch.
B97, § 11, 24 Stat. 637. The Court concluded that "in
enacting this section [ § 11 of the Edmunds-Tucker Act]
the Congress of the United States must have recog·
nized the fact that, as the laws of the territory stood
up to that time [Laws of 1884, p. 75, § 4]
children had the right to inherit from their fathers ...
In re Garr's Estate, supra, at 762, (emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court also reviewed the prior in·
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terpretation of the identical predecessor statute by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Cope v. Cope,
137 U.S. G82 ( 1891), which held that:
"[This section] docs not declare the children
of polygamous marriages to be legitimate; in
fact, it treats them as illegitimate, or, rather,
it does not, except by indirection or inference,
mention them at all; but it puts all illegitimate
children, whether the f mits of polygamous or
orclinary adulterous or illicit intercourse, upon
an equaHy and vests them with inheritable
blood." Id. (Emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court thus concluded:
"Evidently the intention was that illegitimate
children should have vested in them inheritable
blood and the right to inherit from the father,
when acknowledged by him, in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been
horn legitimate. This is also clear from the
eontext of the statute, especially when interpreted in light of the doctrine of the law hitherto prevailing within this jurisdiction. Such
being the case, the right, when once vested in
the illegitimate, extends to his descendants,
and they likewise become heirs in the event of
the death of their father. Th;s interpretation
thus placed upon the statute in this case is in
consonance with the presumption, which is that,
when the design or object of an enactment is
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not manifestly apparent, the Legislature intended the most beneficial construction to lJe
placed upon it." In re Gnrr' Estate, snpra, at
763.

The Supreme Court of South Dakota in lllocn r.
Jloc11, rn SJ). 210, !J2
13 (HW2), construed its
statute, which in all relevant respects is the same as the
first sentence of section 74-4-10 of the Utah Code, in
a context in which the father died intestate in South
Dakota and the claimant was his illegitimate child born
in Norway. (It is immaterial for present purposes that
most such statutes require the acknowledgment to be in
writing.) The Court's holding described the statute as
follows:

"It describes a class of persons, and declares
that persons of that description shall inherit.
It does not refer to or create a status .... If
the acts constituting the acknowledgment are
in themselves such as the statute prescribes,
they confer the right to inherit in the state
where the real property is situated, without
reference to the intent with which they were
performed. . . . It is, therefore, wholly irnma terial what law existed in Norway relating
to the recognition of illegitimate children when
the \vriting in this case was signed by the plaintiff's father. It may be conceded that he
neither knew nor intended that its execution
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would confer upon the child the right to inherit his property in any jurisdiction." Id. at
15-IG.

The Supreme Court of Iowa similarly construed
its statute, which is also in all relevant respects the same
as section 7 4<-4-10 of the Utah Code, in a case in which
the daimaut, an illegitimate child of his deceased father,
was horn in New Jersey which had no statute allowing
an illegitimate to inherit. Van I-lorn v. Van Horn, 107
Iowa 247, 71 N .\Y. 846 ( 1899). The Court held that,
the decedent's estate being within the state of Iowa,
the Iowa statute which allowed illegitimates to inherit
must be applied.

"It may be that the plaintiff's status is to be
determined by the law of his mother's domicile,
or, in the event of her death, bv
., that of his
own, or of his father's; but with that question
we haYe nothing to do. The sole inquiry here
is, is he entitled to inherit the real estate and
personal property situated in this state, under
the facts presented in evidence? Our conclus:on is that the laws of New Jersey are wholly immaterial and that the trial court was right
in sustaining plaintiff's demurrer." Id. at 839.

In In re JYehr's Estate, 96 Mont. 245, 29 P.2d 836

( 1!)34), the Supreme Court of Montana construed its

statute, which is also in all relevant respects the same
as section 7 4-4-10 of the Utah Code, in a case where
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an illegitimate child, horn and living in Germany laid
claim to his biological father's l\Iontana estate. The
Court held that the illegitimate child was an heir under
the l\lontana law, quoting from the Illinois case of
Hall V. Gabbert, 213 111. 208, 72 N.,v. SOG, 809.

" 'As we view the law, it is immaterial what
the laws of Indiana or Ohio, or any other country are or were. \Ve look to our own law, and
read it as it is written: Then to the facts, and,
if the faC'ts bring the claimant within our law,
then he is entitled to its benefits, whateYer
may he his status elsewhere.' " In re JVehr's
11..'strd c, s11 pra, 839.

Bf.1;thc

Cal. .'.532, 31 P. 915 (1882),in·
volYe<l a father at all times domiciled in the State of
California ancl a mother and illegitimate child at all
relenmt times domiciled in England. The case consid·
ered two California statutes, one a legitimation by sub·
sequent marriage statute and the other a statute which
in all relevant respects is the same as section 74-4-10
of the Utah Code. As regards the latter statute, the
Court said:
t'. ""1.IJrcs, DG

"It is unnecessary to decide whether this pro·
vis:on affects the .'!talus of the child or whether
it is alone a statute of descent. If it either directly or indirectly touches upon her status,
our views upon the question, as herein previously expressed, are applicable. If it is a
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statute of descent pure and simple, - and
Estate of J\Iagee, 64 Cal. 414, seems to so declare in explicit terms, - then the plaintiff is
entitled to all the benefits of it, regardless of
domicile, status, or extraterritorial operation of
laws." Id. at 924.
In a subsequent consideration of this statute In re
Lloyd's Estate, 170 Cal. 85, 148 P. 522 (1915),
the California Supreme Court declared that this statute
is "simply a statute of succession or inheritance." Id. at
5t3.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held a
similar Kansas statute to be one of descent which had
no effect upon the status of the child, its only purpose
being to give an illegitimate child the right to inherit
from the father following public recognition of paternity. Phcifcr v. 1Vright, 41 F.2d 464 {10th Cir.
1930). The statute involved in that case provided in
language similar to section 74-4-10:
"llligitimate children inherit from the mother,
and the mother from the children.
"They shall inherit from the father whenever
they• have heen recorrnized
by him as his chilb
drcn; but such retognition must have been general and notorious, or else in writing.. ."Id. at
466-67, quoting Kansas Revised Statutes of
1923, Sections 22-121 and 22-122.

•
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.After holding that the statute did not "change the
status of a child from illegitimate to legitimate", the
Court went on to conclude that it, therefore, had no
extraterritorial application in Oklahoma being only a
statute of inheritance concerned solely with
property rights. Id. at M37-G8.

A_ comparison of the language of the first sentence
of section 74-4-10 with the language of Utah's two
legitimation statutes will readily disclose a disparity of
both language ancl manifest purpose between the form·
er arnl the latter. The legitimation proYisions, it 11111
he noted, both specifically proYide that the theretofore
illegitimate child, following compliance with their terms,
becomes "legitimate, while section 74-4-10 provides only
that the (still) illegitimate child, following acknowl·
edgment inherits from its father as if' born in lawful
wedlock.
Succession Statute:

F.C ..A. § 7.t-4-10. Illegitimate childrc11-I11hcrita11cc by.--EYery illegitimate child is an
heir of the person who acknowledges himself
to he the father of such child, and in all cases
is an heir of his mother; and inherits his or her
estate, in whole or in part, as the case may be,
in the same manner as if he had been born in
lawful ttcrllock. The issue of all marriages null
in law, or dissolYed by divorce are legitimate.
[Emphasis added].

13

Legitimat:on by Adoption Statute:
U.C.A. § 78-:30-12. Adoption by Acknowledg-

mcnt.--The father of an illegitimate child,
by publicly acknowledging it as his own, receiving it as such with the consent of his wife,
if he is married, into his family, and otherwise
trr:1ting it as if it were a legitimate child,
thereby adopts it as such, and such child is
thereupon deemed for all purposes legitimate
from the time of its birth . . . [Emphasis
added].

Legitimation by Jlarringf Statute:
U.C.A. § 77-G0-14. l\larriage of parties legitimates child-Exception.-If the mother of
any such ehilcl and the father shall at any time
after its birth intermarry, the child shall in
all respects he dcemccl to be legitirnate, and the
lioJHl for its support shall become void; [except
in cases where the mother or parents have preYiously consented to its adoption] . . . [Emphasis aclclccl].

Comparison of the forego;ng provisions also invites
eontrast of their requirements. It cannot be gainsaid
that complete legitimation requires more formality and
additional unequivocal action under our statutes, than
docs aclmowledgmcnt for inheritance purposes only.
If legitimation could be accomplished by mere com-
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pliancc with the first sentence of section 7!-4-10, the
more onerous requirements of sections 77-Ci0-14 and
78-:30-1 :2 would he mere su rplusage in the law, since,
in Yirtually all cases, facts constituting acknowledg.
ment are present contemporaneously with the facts sat·
isfying the requirements of the latter statutes. Section
78-:30-1:2 illustrates this point, inasmuch as by its terms
acknowledgment is only the first of several necessar)·
steps to legitimation.

It may be argued that the final sentence of section
74-4-10 is a legit;mation provision and that it, hy infer·
ence, colors the precccling sentence of that section with
a presumption of similar legislative intent. Howerer,
the initial premise of this argument is fallacious, since
the final sentence is not a legitimation statute as that
term is generally understoocl, but is a definitional pro·
vision wh:ch simply declares that the issue of marriages
null in hrn·, or dissolved bv divorce, wel'e never illegiti·
mate, thus making both, legitimation by some act of the
parent, and acknowledgment, wholly unnecessary where
such issue is concerned. Furthermore, that final sentence
was addecl to the statute at the time of its reinactment
by the legislatme as part of the codification of 1898,
following admission of Utah to statehood. It was in·
tended to undo 1111 nc pro t1111c the gratuitious illegitima·
tion declared with respect to thousands of Utah chi!·
dren by the Eclnmnds-Tucker Act of 1887. It simply
represented a restoration of the status of legitimacy
rather than a statutory opportunity for legitimatiou.
The basic language of the preceding sentence on the
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other hand dates back to section 714 of the Territorial
Laws of 1876. Sec Garr's Estate, supra, at 762.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT EHRED IN
HOLDING THAT DETERl\IINATION
OF S TATU S OF APPELLANTS'
MOTHER AS AN ILLEGITIMATE
UNDER THE ILLINOIS LAW OF
HER
'VOULD RESULT
IND I SHE RI TAN CE OF APPELLANTS UNDER UTAH LAW O:F INTESTATE SUCCESSION.
The primary question before this Court is not the
status of the mother of Appellants as legitimate or illegitimate, it being conceded arguendo that the grandmother of Appellants, Radke and Hornberg, was never
married to the father of the decedent, but rather the
issue imolves capacity of children of an Illinois illegitimate to take property of their uncle by intestate succession under Utah law.
Succession to the Utah probate estate of an intestate, who dies domiciled within the State of Utah,
determined exclusively by the law of intestate successwn of the State of Utah. The law of status, even if
determinable under Illinois law, is thus not dispositive
of the issue. It should be noted, however, that Utah is
not constitutionally required to determine Appellants'
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status by reference to Illinois law. See Olmsted
sled, 21G U.S. 38() ( HllO).

t'.

Olm.

The quest;on of legitimacy or illegitimacy of any
person is an issue of status ref erahle to the law goven;.
ing such status at that person's domicile, according to
the most conunonly applied choice of law rule. The
question of heirship, on the other hand, is an issue of
succession rights in property referable to the law of
the situs of the property. The situs of real property is
fixe<l by natural and political geography while the situs
of personality is fixed by the domicile of the owner.
In the instant case the undisputed situs of all property
of the decedent, both real and personal, is within the
State of Utah.
The cases and textual authorities are unanimous in
holcling that, "The law of the situs of the property de·
termines what class of persons lvill inherit property in
the state, since that is a question of descent and not of
status ... " 87 A.L.H.2cl 1280, § 7. See Bancroft's Pro·
bate Practice, 2d Ed., § 1129; 10 Am. Jur.2d, § 162
Bastards. p. 952. This is the position taken by the Re·
statcmcnt
of Co11f'licts, "The devolution of
interests in land u p<m the death of the owner intestate
is determined by the law that would be applied by the
courts of the situs." Id. at § 23G ( 1). "\Vhether a person
must he legitimate in order to inherit any interest in land
upon intestacy or to receive a forced share therein is
determined by the law that would be applied by the
courts of the situs. These Courts would usually apply
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their own local law in determining this question." Id. at
§ 2.'37 ( 1).
The general choice of law rule is that:
" [I] f the statute of the situs is one of descent
hy which the children born out of wedlock, or
certain defined classes of illegitimates, may
inherit irrespective of whether or not they have
been legitimated by their personal law, or other
type of statute regarded, on one basis or another, as a statute of inheritance, the child
born out of wedlock in another state may inherit
at the situs even though by his personal law
he has not been given the status of a legitimate
and could not have inherited property there,
although there is some authority to the contrary." 10 Am. Jur.2d, § 152, Bastards, pp.
9.5!3-.H. See, Ester, Illegitimate Chil<lren and
Conflict of Laws, 36 Ind. L. J. 163, 177
(rn6o).

\Vere the situation reversed, the Illinois Courts
would uniformly determine that the Illinois law of intestate succession would apply to inheritance of Illinois
probate property by one having the status of an illegitimate in Utah.
"['l']he state in which land is located has the
power to control it, and jurisdiction to adjudicate questions as to its ownership; accordingly, it is the general principle that all questions

18

of title to land urc decided in accordance with
the law of the state where the land is. In applying this general principle, it is uniformly
held that the devolution of real property on
death of its owner intestate follmvs the comse
prescribed by law of descent of the state in
which the land is situated."
1llcNa111ara ·u.
303 Ill. 191, 135 N.E. 4rn
( 1922). See, Fuhrhop v . .LL 11sti11, 385 Ill. 149, 52 N.E.2rl
267 ( 1943) ; Stoltz v. Doeing, 112 Ill. 235 ( 1885).

It is, therefore, submitted that Illinois law is not
and cannot be concerned with Utah's method of inle·
state distribution and that there is, in fact, no conflict
of law question involved here.

POINT III.

THE LCHVER COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDEXT'S A llTHORITIES, P ARTICULARLY THE FORNEY AND POPP
CASES, GOVERN THE INTERPRETATIOX OF SECTION 74-4-10, UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS APPLIED TO INTESTATE SUCCESSION CASES.
In In re Forncy's Estate, 43 Nev. 227, 184

( 1919), rch. den. 186 P. 678 ( 1920), a California donu·

cilliary died intestate leaving a daughter born out of
wedlock in California and a bank account located in a
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Xerada hank. X evada ancl California each had a legitimtion by adoption statute identical to section 78-30-12
of onr Code. Each state also had a provision allowing

acknowledged illegitimates to inherit from their fathers,
but the statutes of both states required the acknowledgment to he in writing subscribed by a credible witness. These statutes providing for inheritance by acknowledged illegitimates were, therefore, not even
raise<l in the case, because there was no evidence that
the decedent, had ever acknowledged the daughter in
writing. Since the decedent died domiciled in California,
and since the N eva<la bank account was personalty having a legal situs in California, the Nevada Court properly applied California law to determine both the status
of the daughter and her right to inherit. She was determined to he illegitimate under the California statute,
because the decedent had no family to take her into, his
public acknowledgment of paternity nothwithstanding,
and since the succession by illegitimates statutes were
not inrnlved, the common law applicable in California,
which denied to illegitimates the right to inherit, was
applicable. Therefore, the daughter was not entitled to
the hank account.
It is readily apparent that the holding of the Forney
case has no application at all to this case since the Utah
statute expressly abrogating the common law rule is
in this case, no requirement of written acknowledgment being present. At most, Forney can only
be cited for the general principles, admitted by the Ap-
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pellants at the outset, that the law of the domicile of
the claimant determines her status as legitimate or il!e.
gitimate, and that the law of the legal situs of property.

i.e. California, controls succession rights in such prop.
erty.
In Popp v. Roth, 9 Utah 2d 96, 338 P.2d 123
( In59), one claiming to be the natural father of a child,
placed for adoption by its mother, brought a habeas
corpus proceeding to recover custody of the child from
the adoptive parents, claiming that the child was legili·
mated under the adoption provision of section 78-30·1
of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and that, therefore, it
could not be adopted without his consent. This Court
properly held that, since the child was born illegitimate
in Illinois, since the purported marriage of its parents
took place in Illinois, and since Illinois was, at the times
of hoth events, the domicile of the child, the question
of its legitimation was determinable under Illinois law,
rather than Utah law. Under Illinois law the child was
determined to have the status of an illegitimate because
the marriage of the parents was void, and the writ was
accordingly denied. Neither, application of section 7H
10, nor the question of inheritance by the child, was at
issue, and neither could have been, since the father was
a living Higant in the case. The Popp case, therefore,
also simply stands for the well worn rule that the law
of the domicile of the child governs its status.
It is submitted that neither of the two cases prin·
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cipally relied upon by the lower court is even remotely
in point, and that they have no application whatever to
the issues presented by the parties' respective Motions
for S11rnmary .Judgment determining heirship.
The other Utah cases relied upon by the Respondent, Rohwer v. District Court, 41 Utah 279, 125 P. 671
(l!J12), and 1lla11ficld v. Neff, 43 Utah 258, 134 P.
IHiO ( 1913), are equally inapplicable to the issues before this Court. Neither case is concerned with section
74-4-10 of the Utah Code or its predecessor statutes.
Each case deals with a legitimation statute which prorided that the issue of plural marriages born prior to
certain specified dates were legitimated. The other cases
and authorities which have been cited by the Respondent
either stand for propositions which have been acknowledged hy Appellants, or which are totally irrelevant to
this case or, which support the position of Appellants.
POINT IV.
THE LO\VER COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT RADKE AND
HORNBERG ARE NOT THE HEIRS
OF THE DECEDENT UNDER SECTION 74-4-!>(4) UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.
The father of the decedent openly and repeatedly
acknowledged that he was the father of the mother of
Appellants, Radke and Hornberg. [Record at 34, 35,
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47, 76 and 103.] The acknowledgment is not conteste1,I
Utah Code Annotated, 195:3, section 74-4-10 providei
that an illegitimate child is an heir of the person who
acknowledges himself to he the father of such chilJ
and inherits his estate in full or in part as the case mar
he in the same manner as if he had been born in
wedlock. In light of the legislative history and inten\
behind this Section, the Utah Courts have interpreteu
the statute in an enlightened manner and have deter·
mined that it is intended to treat the duly acknowledgeu,
illegitimate child in the same manner for purposes of
inheritance as his legitimate brothers and sisters, without
actually legitimating him.
In interpreting this statute, the Utah Courts han
been "mindful of the fact that in this state,
to the general rule that statutes in derogation of the
common la\V must be strictly construed, such statutes
are to he liberally construed with a view to effect the
objects of the statutes and to promote justice." In r1
Garr's Estate, supra, at 761. In Garr's Estate it was
"urged that under our laws the rights of an illegitimale
and of his descendants, whatever they may be, are stricl·
ly lineal, never collateral, and that, therefore, the Ap·
pellants have no claim to the estate." Id. at 761. The
Court rejected this contention.
"The provisions are broad and comprehensive,
and a full compliance with them would clearly
seem to remove all disabilities existing at com·
mon law as to the right of such a child to in·
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herit, ancl as to such right, place it upon the
same hasis as a legitimate child." Id. at 761.
Although Utah has at times been a leader, it has
no means been the only state to remove the remaining
restiges of the common law filius nulliu.i; concept. In interpreting statutes similar to Utah's, Courts have held
that a child of an illegitimate parent can inherit from
that parent's legitimate brothers and sisters, see e.g.,
Hudson v. Reed, 259 Ala. 340, 66 So.2d 990
(1953); State v. Chavez, 42 N.l\I. 569, 82 P.2d 900
( Hl38) : Grundy v. II adfield, 16 R.I. 579, 18 A. 186
(188fl), and that an illegitimate child can inherit from
its legitimate brothers and sisters, see e.g. Blethyn v.
Bidder, 80 F.Supp. 962 (D.C. Colo. 1948); re
Kl!n{{aman's Estate, 128 A.2d 31 (Del. 1957) ; Rhode
Island Hosp. 1'rust Co. ·u. Ilodglcin, 48 R.I. 459, 137
A. 381, reh den 138 A. 184 ( 1927). There are other
cases, interpreting statutes in some respects similar to
Utah's, which narrowly construe the statutes and refuse
to place the illegitimate child on an equal footing with
his legitimate brothers and sisters. It is submitted that
these cases are vestigal relics of the feudal system's
treatment of bastards as f ilius nullius. It is further submitted that the purpose of the common law harsh treatnient of bastards was to protect estates from dissipation
in a society which condoned the loose morality of upper
class males. This principle does not have, nor has it
erer had, any validity in Utah. We, therefore, ask this
Court to continue the enlightened and compassionate
Utah approach which is to treat acknowledged bastards

1
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and their children in the same manner as if they baa
been born in lawful wedlock.
CONCLUSION
Because the decedent left neither issue, husbana
wife, father, mother, brother nor sister surviving him,
his estate should be distributed to the children of
half-sister by right of representation, there being no
living descendants of any other brother or sister. U.C.A.
§§ 7 4-4-5 ( 4) , 74-4-17 ( 1 U53) . The fact that the decea·
ent' s deceased half-sister is treated as illegitimate for
purposes of the present controversy, does not result in
disinheritance of her descendants, since she was acknowl·
edged by the decedent's father. U.C.A. § 74-4-10. Re·
spondent and the remainder of the class of cousins-ger·
man of the decedent, being more remote in degree of
kinship to the decedent than are Appellants and claim·
ing as against children of a deceased sister, are not next
of kin and are not entitled to ·inherit any part of hii
estate. U.C.A. § 74-4-7 ( 6).
I

Respectfully submitted,
FABIAN' & CLENDENIN
By N arrvel E. Hall and
Glen E. Clark
Attorneys for PlaintiffsAppellants
800 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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and theii· tchildren in the same manner as if they had
been bom'in lawful wedlock.
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CONCLUSION

Rec:. se the decedent Jeft neither issue, husband,
wife,
mother, brother nor sister suniving him,
his estak should be distributed to the children of his
by right of representation,
being no
hnng de!:t·ndants of any other brother or sister. U.C.A.
§§ 7 4-4-t 4) , 7 4-4-17 ( 1953) . The fact that the deced·
ent's
sed half-sister is treated as illegitimate for
purposes of the present controversy, does not result in
dis!11herit111t1ce of her descendants, since she was acknowl·
eclgecl by fhe decedent's father. U.C.A. § 'i 4<-4<-.IO. Re·
spondent d the remainder of the class of eousms-ger·
man of
decedent, being more remote in degree of
kinship b·,tthe decedent than are Appellants and claim·
ing as ag nst children of a deceased sister, are not next
of kin all are not entitled to ·inherit any part of his
estate. U J ..;.• A. § 7 4-4-7 ( 6).
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APPENDIX "A"

(CARRY)
BRl KE (BRECK)

B BIRTH
H - MA.i.RlACE
H(l). FIRST MA.IIBlAGE
H(2)HARRIAGE

*

EUGENE
HENRY
HARIE DUQUESNE

D (C) (D) -

B-About 1856
D-11/9/1924

B-11/12/1857
D-9/14/1921

* ** -

*** -

DEATH
CLAl!'-lf.'H

DECEDE:<T

a/k/ a EUGEA);E, EUGEtl
a/k/a ECGENE, EUGENIE
a/k/a DUQUAINE,

____

,,.._,,_-_-

HENRIETTA
DUQUESNE

B-About 1878
M-11/ 1/1902
D-1/6/1904

FRANK M. COURSE
No Issue

BERTHA V.
DUQUESNE

B-l/7/1880
• D-1/27/1930

Single

EUGENE
DUQUESNE

B-2/28/ 1882
D-12/28/1886
Cemetery

!l.EUT J
DUQUESl-10: (Cu _

B-4/23/ 132.'.i

D-10/20/1970
Single

Single

(D)

JEANETTE (JEANNETTE

B"OYTE

B-1/20/ 1913
M-12/31/1936

FRED J. RADKE
(C)
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)C
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